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I. INTRODUCTION
The sale or exchange of encumbered property is a garden-variety
transaction in any financed venture.' Although this standard transaction
1. Transfers of encumbered property arise in everyday transactions such as a contribution of
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is unremarkable from a business perspective, the tax rules associated
with such transfers are replete with inconsistencies, irrationalities and
inefficiencies. In short, the tax side of this garden-variety transaction is
a complex labyrinth through which taxpayers must maneuver, avoiding
wrong turns along the way.
The easiest way to make a wrong turn in this garden-variety trans-
action is to transfer property with an encumbrance exceeding the prop-
erty's adjusted tax basis.2 When property is transferred with a
corresponding liability, a realization event occurs; the assumed or trans-
ferred liability becomes part of the transferor's amount realized.3 The
transferor may be required to recognize gain on the transfer if the under-
lying debt exceeds his or her basis in the transferred property. For
example, section 357(c) imposes a tax on the transferor of over-encum-
bered property transferred to a newly-organized, controlled corporation,
to the extent that the assumed liability exceeds the transferor's tax basis
in the property. As a general rule, however, "there is no income unless
and until there has been a release of liability."4
Application of the general rule to nonrecourse liabilities is elemen-
tary. The transfer of property subject to a nonrecourse liability triggers
gain. In short, the liability follows the property. The general rule
becomes convoluted when the property transferred is subject to a
recourse liability. Should a taxpayer who transfers over-encumbered
property but remains primarily liable for the debt recognize gain on the
disposition of property which is only secondarily liable? Under the
aforementioned general rule, one would think not, because the liability
has not been transferred and there has not been a "release of liability."
The Internal Revenue Service ("Service") recognizes an exception
to the general rule, requiring a transferor to recognize gain on the trans-
fer of over-encumbered property to a related transferee, even though the
transferor remains primarily liable. When encumbered property is trans-
ferred and the transferor remains primarily liable, the deemed transfer of
encumbered property to a business, nonrecourse financing for a highly leveraged financed
acquisition, and negotiated contingent liabilities such as environmental hazards clean-up costs.
See generally Elliott Manning & Jerome M. Hesch, Sale or Exchange of Business Assets:
Economic Performance, Contingent Liabilities and Nonrecourse Liabilities (Part One), 11 TAX
MGMT. REAL EST. J. 19 (1995).
2. Section 1012 states that "[tihe basis of property shall be the cost of such property, except
as otherwise provided ...... I.R.C. § 1012 (1997). Unless otherwise indicated, all section
references herein are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1997, as amended, and the regulations
thereunder. The regulations define "cost" as "the amount paid for such property in cash or other
property." Treas. Reg. § 1.1012-1(a) (as amended in 1994).
3. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-2(a) (1980).
4. Maher v. Commissioner, 469 F.2d 225, 229 (8th Cir. 1972) (citing MERTENS LAW OF
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 11. 19).
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liability makes little sense and yields inconsistent results. The exception
to the general rule that there is no income unless there has been a release
of liability leads to inconsistent positions, not only within the Service
and the Tax Court, but also among the circuits. For example, the Ser-
vice applies the general rule where encumbered property is transferred to
an unrelated party in exchange for a wraparound liability and where the
transferor remains primarily liable.' However, the Service advocates a
contrary result when the transfer of over-encumbered property is
between related parties, taxing the transferor without regard to whether
he or she remains primarily liable.6
In 1996, the Service released a Technical Advice Memorandum7
that calls into question the core of the Service's longstanding policy
toward transfers of over-encumbered property when a recourse liability
exceeds the property's tax basis.8 In its latest decision, the Service took
the position that although the transferor remains primarily liable for a
recourse liability, he must recognize gain on the transfer of collateral
because the encumbrance exceeds the transferor's basis in the collateral.
Although courts, commentators, and the Service accept the practice of
taxing transfers involving recourse liabilities without regard to whether
the transferor remains primarily liable, this recent decision underscores
the absurdity inherent in this overbroad proposition.
This Comment argues that the inconsistent results involving the
transfer of property subject to recourse liabilities where the transferor
remains primarily liable are attributable to the Service's paranoia regard-
ing transfers of over-encumbered property between related parties. As a
general rule, the Code should not tax a transfer of property that is over-
encumbered by a recourse liability if the transferor remains primarily
liable. This over-expansive application, as the recent Technical Advice
Memorandum demonstrates, yields inconsistent and absurd results, sup-
ported only by elevating form over substance.
Parts II and III analyze the recent Technical Advice Memorandum,
5. In 1987, the Service took the position that a transfer of property subject to a recourse
liability was a taxable event, where the transferor remained primarily liable and the transferee
executed a wraparound mortgage in favor of the transferor. See Professional Equities, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 89 T.C. 165 (1987). The Service lost. Id. at 181. In a Cumulative Bulletin, the
Service announced its acquiescence, admitting that its position in Professional Equities was in
error. See 1988-2 C.B. 1.
6. See Owen v. Commissioner, 881 F.2d 832 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1070
(1990). But see Lessinger v. Commissioner, 872 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1989).
7. Tech. Adv. Mem. 96-40-001 (Nov. 29, 1994).
8. For over forty years, the Service has maintained an overbroad policy toward taxing
transfers of a liability regardless of whether the transferor remains primarily liable. See, e.g.,
Stonecrest Corp. v. Commissioner, 24 T.C. 659 (1955). But see supra note 5 (discussing the
Service's acquiescence in Professional Equities).
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explaining how absurd results follow from expansive use of section
357(c) in the context of recourse liabilities. Part IV examines the incon-
sistent treatment of property transfers where an encumbrance exceeds
basis, beginning with two Supreme Court decisions that raise the issue
in the context of nonrecourse lending,9 and ending with a split regarding
whether the same treatment should be accorded to the transfer of prop-
erty subject to a recourse liability where the transferor remains primarily
liable. Part V argues that the Service's rationale for expanding section
357(c), insofar as it taxes all recourse debt unassumed by a related trans-
feree, is inconsistent with congressional intent. Further, any attempt to
expand section 357(c) to include unassumed recourse liabilities is an
attempt to elevate form over substance without legislative authority. Part
VI re-analyzes the nature and purpose of taxing recourse liabilities, and
attempts to provide an economic framework to determine when the
transfer of property that is over-encumbered by recourse liabilities
should, and should not, trigger gain to the transferor.
II. THE TECHNICAL ADVICE MEMORANDUM
The issue of gain recognized on the disposition of property where
an encumbrance exceeds basis arises in a variety of contexts.' 0 In the
Technical Advice Memorandum, the issue arose in the context of a con-
tribution of property to a controlled corporation under section 351.11
What follows is an analysis of the framework of section 351, section
357(c)-the exception to the general nonrecognition rule of section
351-and the reasons why the Service argues that the transfer section
357(c) in the Technical Advice Memorandum should fall within the
exception, requiring the transferor to recognize gain on the transfer.
A. Section 351: Nonrecognition on the Transfer of Property to a
Controlled Corporation
Section 351 provides for the tax-free transfer of property to a cor-
poration in exchange for stock, provided that certain conditions are satis-
fied.12 It also provides that in the case of an exchange where one
9. Commissioner v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300 (1983); Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1 (1947).
10. For example, the issue may arise in a sale of property where the liability exceeds both the
fair market value and the basis of property. The regulations provide that the amount of discharged
indebtedness is included in the amount realized. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-2 (1980). In addition,
the issue may arise when a taxpayer walks away from a nonrecourse liability after all depreciation
deductions have been taken and the property's fair market value is less than the principal on the
debt. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300 (1983). Gain is triggered when the taxpayer
is released from his or her obligation to repay the loan. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-2 (1980).
11. See Tech. Adv. Mem. 96-40-001 (Nov. 29, 1994).
12. Section 351 (a) provides for nonrecognition of gain or loss on the transfer of assets in kind
to a corporation which the transferor(s) "control." See I.R.C. § 351(a) (1997). "Control" is in
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transferor assumes or acquires property subject to a liability, the
assumption or acquisition does not prevent the exchange from falling
within section 351, and the liabilities assumed in the exchange are not
classified as boot.
13
B. Section 357(c): A Trap for the Unwary
Section 357(c) sets forth the exception to the general nonrecogni-
tion rule of section 351 where property transferred is subject to a liabil-
ity that exceeds basis. 4 It provides that, in the case of an exchange to
which section 351 applies:
[I]f the sum of the amount of liabilities assumed, plus the amount of
the liabilities to which the property is subject, exceeds the total of the
adjusted basis of the property transferred pursuant to such exchange,
then such excess shall be considered as a gain from the sale or
exchange of a capital asset or of property which is not a capital asset,
as the case may be.1
5
Thus, if a taxpayer transfers property with a basis of $10,000, sub-
ject to liabilities of $30,000, the taxpayer must recognize gain of
$20,000-the amount by which the liability assumed exceeds the tax-
payer's basis. 16 What if the transferee does not take the property subject
to the liability and the transferor remains primarily liable? The regula-
tions state that the "same result will follow whether or not the liability is
assumed by the transferee." 7
C. The Technical Advice Memorandum: A Factual Analysis
The Technical Advice Memorandum presents a fairly common sce-
nario. A corporation and shareholder attempt to secure a series of loans.
Individually, neither qualify for the requested financing. To obtain bank
financing, both the shareholder and the corporation enter into a cross-
collateralization and a cross-default agreement. The agreements provide
that all real property of both the shareholder and the corporation secures
turn defined as meaning ownership of at least eighty percent of the voting power and eighty
percent of all outstanding classes of stock. See id. (cross-referencing § 368(c)).,
13. See id. § 351(b). Section 351 provides for the general nonrecognition rules applicable to
a transfer of property to a controlled corporation in exchange for stock. See id. § 351(a).
Subsection (b) states that any "other" property (excluding the stock) distributed to the corporation
still qualifies as a 351 transaction, but the taxpayer must recognize gain on the boot. See id.
§ 351(b). Subsection (d) has been interpreted to exclude assumed or acquired liabilities from the
boot recognition rule in subsection (c). See id. § 351(d).
14. See id. § 357(c).
15. Id. § 357(c)(1).
16. See Treas. Reg. § 1.357-2(a) (as amended in 1980).
17. Id.
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each debtor's respective liabilities to the bank."8 Thus, this transaction
involves a recourse liability where the shareholder and the corporation
bear primary liability for their respective debts, and the collateral
includes multiple properties which are secondarily liable in the event
that either debtor defaults.
The cross-collateralized transaction goes awry, however, when the
shareholder transfers a single asset in exchange for stock in the corpora-
tion. Although this transaction meets the requirements for nonrecogni-
tion treatment under section 351,19 the total liabilities attributable to the
shareholder exceed the shareholder's basis in this single asset.20  The
Service maintains that this constitutes a release of liability regardless of
whether the shareholder/transferor remains primarily liable for the debt.
The Service takes the position that in transferring the asset, the transac-
tion falls within the exception to section 351.21 Because the taxpayer's
total liabilitiy exceeds his basis in the single asset, the taxpayer must
recognize gain to the extent of such excess because section 357(c)
applies "to all liabilities ... regardless of whether the transferor retains
personal liability. 22
The Memorandum also addresses the issue of the shareholder's
basis in the corporate stock received in the section 351 exchange. 23 Sec-
tion 358 of the Code prescribes the applicable rules for adjusting basis in
this transaction.24 Under subsection (a), the shareholder takes the basis
in the property transferred 25 reduced by the liabilities assumed (even
though no liabilities were actually assumed), 26 and increased by the
amount of gain recognized27 (the excess of liabilities over basis). Since
18. See Tech. Adv. Mem. 96-40-001 (Nov. 29, 1994).
19. This closely held corporation was owned by two shareholders. Prior to the transfer of the
single asset, the shareholder owned a two percent interest. Id. Presumably, the transfer of the
asset gave the shareholder an eighty percent interest in the corporation.
20. Query why the Service aggregated the sum total of the shareholder's liabilities to this
single asset instead of pro-rating the liabilities proportionately among all of the assets securing the
loan. Does this mean that if the shareholder later transfers another asset he will be taxed on the
amount that his total liabilities exceed the value of each asset transferred? See discussion infra
Part III.A.
21. See Tech. Adv. Mem. 96-40-001 (Nov. 29, 1994).
22. Id. See also supra note 17 and accompanying text (discussing the approach taken under
the regulations).
23. See Tech. Adv. Mem. 96-40-001 (Nov. 29, 1994).
24. See I.R.C. § 358(a) (1997).
25. See id. § 358(a)(1).
26. See id. § 358(a)(l)(A). Section 358(d)(1) provides that "assumption or acquisition (in the
amount of the liability) shall, for purposes of this section, be treated as money received by the
taxpayer on the exchange." Thus, under § 358(a)(1), the property exchanged is decreased by "the
fair market value of any other property ... received by the taxpayer"-i.e., the amount of the
liability assumed. See id. § 358(a)(l)(A)(i).
27. See id. § 358(a)(l)(B)(ii).
[Vol. 52:365
TRANSFER OF RECOURSE LIABILITIES
the asset was subject to liabilities in excess of the shareholder's basis in
the asset, the shareholder's basis in the stock received is decreased
below zero by the amount of liabilities to which the asset was seconda-
rily liable, and was increased to zero by the amount of gain recognized
under section 357(c). As a result, the shareholder has a zero basis in the
stock received. On a subsequent disposition of the stock, the share-
holder will recognize the full value received because he has no basis to
offset the amount realized.28
III. ABSURD RESULTS TO FOLLOW
Although the regulations and corresponding body of case law29
implicitly make section 357(c) applicable to recourse loans, absurd
results follow from such application. To illustrate the absurdity, con-
sider some potential future transactions involving the corporation and
the shareholder in the Technical Advice Memorandum. If the share-
holder later transfers other assets that also served as collateral for the
loan, consider how this decision would shift basis to the corporation,
thereby permitting it to obtain full taxable benefits from the transferred
asset while the shareholder shoulders all corresponding tax burdens.
The central issue that leads to certain absurdity in this transaction is the
fact that there has been no transfer of liability.
A. Shareholder Transfers of Multiple Assets in Separate
§ 351 Transactions
The Service's position, taken literally, would assess taxable gain
each time the shareholder transferred an asset where its basis was less
than the liabilities. Assume that the facts in the Technical Advice Mem-
orandum are as follows: The shareholder secures a $100,000 note with
ten assets having a total basis of $100,000 ($10,000 each). In 1996, the
shareholder transfers one asset to a corporation in exchange for an
eighty percent interest.30 Under section 357(c) and the logic of the
Technical Advice Memorandum, the shareholder 'would be required to
recognize gain of $90,000-the amount of the liability ($100,000)
decreased by the basis in the asset transferred ($10,000). The share-
holder would continue paying the loan-because it is a recourse debt-
and takes a zero basis in his shares in the corporation.3'
28. See id. § 1001(a) (providing that the gain realized shall be the excess of the amount
realized over the adjusted basis in the property transferred).
29. See discussion infra Section IV.
30. Presumably, the transaction meets all § 351 requirements for nonrecognition treatment.
31. The basis computation for the shareholder's interest in his shares follows: The
shareholder's basis in the asset transferred ($10,000), reduced by the amount of liabilities assumed
($100,000), increased by the amount of gain recognized ($90,000), yielding a zero basis.
19971
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Assume that the next year the shareholder decided to contribute
asset number two to a different corporation in exchange for a controlling
interest meeting the requirements for nonrecognition under section 351.
Again, the same results. Assuming no principal payments were made,
the shareholder would be taxed on the difference between the liability
($100,000) and the basis in the asset transferred ($10,000). If this spiral
continued, the shareholder's gain recognized could reach $900,000 on
the release of a $100,000 liability that the shareholder would ultimately
repay.
Of course, this result is absurd. The Service not only ignores the
absurdity of such an outcome, but a recent Private Letter Ruling even
sanctions such treatment. 32 In this ruling, the Service revoked a prior
letter ruling33 that allocated a liability between two assets when the two
assets securing a single liability were transferred between two unrelated
corporations.34 Therefore, even assuming that the two transfers
described above were consummated simultaneously, there would be no
way to split the liability.
B. Basis in Multiple § 357(c) Transactions
There is one truism in American tax law, the premise of which is
quite simple: The U.S. tax system affords various tax benefits, but those
benefits are subject to the caveat that sooner or later, the taxpayer must
bear a corresponding tax or economic burden .3  The Service's most
recent Technical Advice Memorandum, however, appears contrary to
this general rule.
In the Technical Advice Memorandum, the shareholder has a zero
basis in his shares.36 Under section 362(a), the corporation takes the
shareholder's basis in the asset transferred, increased by the amount of
gain recognized by the shareholder.37 If the corporation actually
assumed the shareholder's liability, then its basis in the transferred asset
would increase to reflect the economic cost of issuing its shares. For
example, assume that the shareholder's asset had a basis of $50, subject
to a $40 liability. Because the liabilities do not exceed the shareholder's
basis in the asset transferred, section 357(c) would not apply and section
351 nonrecognition rules would apply. The shareholder would take a
32. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-32-006 (Apr. 26, 1990).
33. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 87-30-063 (Apr. 29, 1987).
34. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-32-006 (Apr. 26, 1990).
35. See, e.g., Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436 (1943);. Harrison
Property Management Co. v. United States, 475 F.2d 623 (Ct. CI. 1973).
36. See discussion supra Part II.C. (concerning the treatment of basis in the Technical Advice
Memorandum).
37. See I.R.C. § 362(a) (1997).
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$10 basis ($50 minus $40) in the shares issued.38 The corporation would
take a $50 basis in the asset transferred.39
If the numbers were transposed and the shareholder's basis in the
asset transferred were $40, subject to a $50 nonrecourse note, the share-
holder would recognize a gain of $10 under section 357(c). His basis in
the distributed shares would be zero.4' The corporation would take the
shareholder's basis in the property ($40), increased by the amount of
gain recognized ($10), yielding a $50 basis in the asset transferred.
Arguably, the corporation would receive a step-up in basis to reflect the
cost incurred in securing the property. That cost must include the
amount of the liabilities that the corporation acquired or assumed when
the transferred property was "subject to a liability." Applying the basis
rules to recourse liabilities generally, and the Technical Advice Memo-
randum specifically, yields outlandish results.
Assume, for example, that the shareholder had a $10,000 basis in
the asset transferred and a $100,000 loan secured by multiple assets.
The gain recognized would be $90,000. 4 ' The shareholder would take a
zero basis in his stock,4" and the corporation would take a $100,000
basis in the asset transferred.43 This does not make sense from an eco-
nomic perspective and is contrary to current case law. To begin with,
the corporation obtains a step-up in basis, but the increase does not accu-
rately reflect the cost of the asset because the corporation has no obliga-
tion to repay the debt. 4 If the asset transferred is used in the
corporation's trade or business, then the corporation has increased the
amount of depreciation that it may deduct.45 Moreover, the question of
38. See id. § 358(a).
39. See id. § 362(a).
40. Under § 358(a), the basis in the asset transferred ($40) would be decreased by the liability
assumed ($50) and increased by the gain recognized by the shareholder ($10), resulting in a basis
of zero.
41. See I.R.C. § 357(c) (1997) (taxing the excess liabilities over basis); see also supra Section
II.A. (discussing the application of § 357(c) to the transfer of a single asset that is one of many
securing a single liability).
42. The difference between the adjusted basis in the property transferred ($10,000) and
liabilities ($100,000), increased by the amount of gain recognized ($90,000), yields a zero basis.
See I.R.C. § 358(a)(1) (1997).
43. The corporation would take the shareholder's basis in the asset transferred ($10,000),
increased by the amount of gain recognized by the shareholder ($90,000), resulting in a $100,000
basis in the property transferred. See I.R.C. § 362(a) (1997).
44. The concept that stock or a note has a "zero basis" has been largely condemned by
academics and practitioners. See Babette B. Barton, Economic Fables/Tax-Related Foibles: On
the "Cost" of Promissory Notes, Guarantees, Contingent Liabilities, and Nonrecourse Loans, 45
TAx L. Rav. 471, 478-79 (1990); Elliott Manning, The Issuer's Paper: Property or What? Zero
Basis and Other Income Tax Mysteries, 39 TAx L. REv. 159 (1984); Stephen G. Utz, Partnership
Taxation in Transition: Of Form, Substance, and Economic Risk, 43 TAX LAW. 693 (1990).
45. See I.R.C. § 167 (1997).
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whether a corporation may include liability which grossly exceeds the
property's fair market value in the transferred asset's basis has been
answered with an anti-taxpayer result. 46 Therefore, application of sec-
tion 357(c) to true recourse liabilities yields absurd results with respect
to basis-shifting minimal tax benefits to the corporation, while impos-
ing all tax burdens on the shareholder who is paying for the corpora-
tion's tax benefits.
C. The Fabled Transfer of Recourse Liability
The precise language of section 357(c) speaks to two types of lia-
bilities: those assumed and those to which the property is subject. The
corporation in the Technical Advice Memorandum did not assume the
shareholder's liabilities. Therefore, the Service was proceeding on a
theory that the property transferred was "subject to a liability." Decep-
tively simple, the "subject to" language in section 357(c) is the catalyst
causing confusion about when a recourse liability is transferred for tax
purposes. At issue is whether a liability that is primarily secured by a
transferor who is obligated to repay, and secondarily secured by prop-
erty if he or she does not meet the obligation, is necessarily transferred
with the collateral.
The "subject to" language presents an interesting issue. Nonre-
course liability or nonrecourse debt is defined as "[d]ebt secured by the
property that it is used to purchase. '4 7 Without question, the "subject
to" language applies to nonrecourse liabilities because the asset is pri-
marily liable in the event of default. In the case of a true recourse liabil-
ity, the property owner is primarily liable and the property is secondarily
liable in the event of default.48 A transfer of property encumbered by
recourse liabilities may, but does not necessarily, result in a release from
the transferor's obligation to repay the debt.
46. In Pleasant Summit Land Corp. v. Commissioner, 863 F.2d 263 (3d Cir. 1988), and Estate
of Isaacson v. Commissioner, 860 F.2d 55 (2d Cir. 1988) (per curiam), the Third and Second
Circuits addressed the issue of whether cost basis includes a nonrecourse mortgage exceeding the
property's fair market value at the time of disposition. The Second Circuit found that the cost
"unreasonably exceeded" the property value and the nonrecourse debt "substantially exceeded"
the property value such that there was neither an investment in the property nor a genuine
indebtedness that would support depreciation and interest deductions. See Estate of Isaacson, 860
F.2d at 56. In light of this precedent, it is unlikely that our fictitious corporation would obtain full
taxable benefits from the gain recognized by the transferor via depreciation deductions based on
inflated basis.
47. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1057 (6th ed. 1990).
48. "Recourse" refers to "[tihe right of a holder of a negotiable instrument to recover against
a party secondarily liable." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1275 (6th ed. 1990).
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1. AVOID ABSURD RESULTS: USE COMMON SENSE
Although this transaction clearly leads to absurd results,49 the Ser-
vice maintains that it is following the plain meaning of section 357(c).5 °
However, as the Supreme Court noted:
When [plain] meaning has led to absurd or futile results, ... this
Court has looked beyond the words to the purpose of the act. Fre-
quently, however, even when the plain meaning did not produce
absurd results but merely an unreasonable one "plainly at variance
with the policy of the legislation as a whole" this Court has followed
that purpose, rather than the literal words.51
2. AMBIGUOUS DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN RECOURSE AND NONRECOURSE
LIABILITIES TANGLE THE ISSUES
Section 7701(g) further obscures section 357(c) by limiting its
application to transfers involving nonrecourse liabilities. That subsec-
tion provides that, "in determining the amount of gain or loss ... with
respect to any property, the fair market value of such property shall be
treated as being not less than the amount of any nonrecourse indebted-
ness to which such property is subject."52 By explicitly including nonre-
course indebtedness for purposes of determining gain or loss, this
subsection implicitly excludes recourse liabilities. As a result, there are
no meaningful guidelines to determine when a recourse liability is
transferred.
3. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF § 357(c)
The legislative history of section 357(c) is scant.53 At least one
commentator has theorized that section 357(c) was enacted in response
to congressional dissatisfaction with the operation of section 112(k),54
49. See discussion supra Part III.
50. See Owen v. Commissioner, 881 F.2d 832, 835 (9th Cir. 1989).
51. United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940) (footnotes
omitted).
52. I.R.C. § 7701(g) (1997) (emphasis added).
53. See S. RaP. No. 83-1622, at 270 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4621, 4908;
H.R. REP. No. 83-1337, at 40 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4017, 4066.
54. Section 112(k) of the 1939 Internal Revenue Code provided in pertinent part:
[I]f, taking into consideration the nature of the liability and the circumstances in the
light of which the arrangement for the assumption or acquisition was made, it
appears that the principal purpose of the taxpayer with respect to the assumption or
acquisition was a purpose to avoid Federal income tax on the exchange, or, if not
such purpose, was not a bona fide business purpose, such assumption or acquisition
(in the amount of the liability) shall, for the purposes of this section, be considered
as money received by the taxpayer upon the exchange.
Revenue Act of 1939, ch. 247, § 213(a), 53 Stat. 862, 870 (1939) (current version at I.R.C.
§ 357(b)(1) (1997)).
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the predecessor to section 357(b).55 Section 112(k) provided for a sub-
jective motivation test,56 or alternatively a business purpose test 5 7 to
determine whether the taxpayer realizes gain on the transfer of encum-
bered property.58 If successful in rebutting the Service's challenge to his
or her subjective motivation or business purpose, the taxpayer could
obtain a tax-free gain by mortgaging property for an amount exceeding
his or her basis and transferring the property, subject to the mortgage, to
a controlled corporation. The taxpayer would have the excess and the
corporation would have to either repay the debt (if it was a transferred
recourse debt) or abandon the property if, after exhausting depreciation
deductions, the fair market value of the property exceeded its adjusted
tax basis.59 Therefore, Congress enacted section 357(c) to provide an
objective test to prevent further tax avoidance under the former subjec-
tive motivation and business purpose tests where a transferee assumed a
recourse liability or took the property subject to a nonrecourse liability.60
The Tax Court and Second Circuit further explained the reasons for
enacting section 357(c). In Rosen v. Commissioner, the Tax Court pro-
nounced that "Congress intended to deal with the case where the trans-
feror takes the deduction for depreciation on account of assets
purchased with borrowed funds and the transferee repays the loan."
6 1
Similarly, the Second Circuit stated that "apparently the purpose of...
section [357(c)] was to prevent a taxpayer's acquiring a permanently
tax-free gain by mortgaging certain.., property for an amount in excess
of basis and then transferring property and mortgage under Section
351.'162 From these cases, it is clear that Congress intended to use sec-
tion 357(c) to capture those who transfer liabilities and avoid taxes.
Therefore, Congress' intended purpose limits the scope of section 357(c)
55. See Colleen M. Martin, Note, Lessinger and Section 357(c): Why a Personal Guarantee
Should Result in Owen Taxes, 10 VA. TAx REV. 215, 218 (1990). An alternative theory was
proposed by George Cooper, who postulates that Congress enacted § 357(c) to resolve judicial
difficulty with negative basis. He argues that, unless gain is recognized when the over-
encumbered asset is transferred, the transferor will have stock with a basis less than zero. See
George Cooper, Comment, Negative Basis, 75 HARV. L. REV. 1352, 1355-56 (1962).
56. See supra note 54. Specifically, § 112 looked to the taxpayer's primary motivation for
transferring liabilities. See id. As with most subjective motivation tests, it is usually easier to read
the taxpayer's mind than to determine his or her "primary motivation" for engaging in a
transaction.
57. See id. A business purpose test has an extremely low threshold. Most transactions have
some business purpose even if tax avoidance is the motivating factor.
58. See id.
59. See, e.g., Jackson v. Commissioner, 708 F.2d 1402, 1405 (9th Cir. 1983). But see
Commissioner v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300 (1983).
60. See Frank M. Burke, Jr. & Sam W. Chisholm, Section 357: A Hidden Trap in Tax-Free
Incorporations, 25 TAx L. REV. 211, 214-15 (1970).
61. 62 T.C. 11, 19 n.3 (1974) (emphasis added), aff'd, 515 F.2d 507 (3d Cir. 1975).
62. Bongiovanni v. Commissioner, 470 F.2d 921, 924 (2d Cir. 1972).
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to transfers of recourse liabilities where such liabilities are likely to be
paid by the transferee (i.e., the transferee assumes the debt), and to trans-
fers of property subject to nonrecourse liabilities. In both situations, the
transferor would no longer be primarily liable for the debt.
IV. ARBITRARY EXPANSION OF § 357(c)
In 1947, the Supreme Court provided taxpayers a tremendous tax
benefit.63 The Court held that a taxpayer must increase his or her tax
basis in encumbered property to include nonrecourse liabilities.' In
effect, this decision permits a taxpayer to take deductions beyond his or
her economic investment.65 Best of all, this unfunded investment has no
strings attached.66 On disposition of the encumbered property, the tax-
payer recognizes gain to the extent the fair market value exceeds his or
her basis. It is unclear from Crane, however, whether the taxpayer
receives a tax-free release of indebtedness if the amount of the underly-
ing debt exceeds the property's fair market value.67
Thirty-six years later, the Court reaffirmed Crane, resolving the
release-of-indebtedness issue left unresolved in Crane.68 In Commis-
sioner v. Tufts, the Court held that, if a taxpayer is permitted to increase
basis by the amount of nonrecourse debt, the taxpayer must also include
the release of indebtedness in calculating the amount realized on disposi-
tion of the property, even if the amount of the debt is greater than the
property's fair market value.69
Crane and Tufts make clear that nonrecourse liabilities are included
63. See Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1 (1947).
64. See id. This is quite a remarkable proposition. The Code provides that "[t]he basis of
property shall be the cost of such property ...." I.R.C. § 1012 (1997). Based on the language of
the statute and the decision in Crane, the cost of property (basis) includes nonrecourse debt which
the owner is not personally liable to repay.
65. A taxpayer can take depreciation deductions for the exhaustion, wear and tear of property
used in a trade or business. See I.R.C. § 167(a) (1997). These deductions are limited to the
taxpayer's basis in the property. See id. § 167(c). The greater the basis, the more depreciation
deductions a taxpayer may take to offset taxable income. Thus, an increase in basis for
nonrecourse liabilities generates tax write-offs without an actual economic outlay.
66. Liability for a nonrecourse debt follows the property, not the owner. The owner of
encumbered property can walk away from the property at any time without any adverse
consequences. This decision, of course, became the spine of the typical 1980's tax shelter where a
taxpayer would purchase property with nonrecourse debt, exhaust all possible depreciation
deductions and, once the fair market value of the property fell below the principal, abandon the
property without any adverse tax or economic consequences.
67. For example, assume the fair market value of property is $10,000, the taxpayer's basis is
$5,000, and the underlying debt is $15,000. Under Crane, it was unclear whether the taxpayer
realized $5,000 (fair market value minus basis) or $10,000 (transferred indebtedness minus basis).
See Crane, 331 U.S. at 15 n.42.
68. See Commissioner v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300 (1983).
69. See id. at 317.
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in the basis of property at acquisition and included in amount realized on
disposition. What remains uncertain, however, is everything in between.
For example, the Court has not visited the issue of whether recourse
liabilities secondarily secured by collateral can trigger section 357(c)
gain when the collateral is transferred and the transferor remains primar-
ily liable.
The courts and the Service are split on the issue of when a transfer
of property is "subject to" a recourse liability. On the one hand, both
have taken the position that a transfer of encumbered property between
related parties involves a transfer of liabilities, regardless of whether the
transferor actually repays the debt.7° On the other hand, both have also
taken the position that a transfer of encumbered property between unre-
lated parties is not tantamount to a transfer of liabilities if the transferor
remains personally liable.71
A. The Service's Position in the Technical Advice Memorandum Is
Inconsistent With Its Position in Professional Equities and
Consistent With Owen-Can This Inconsistency
Be Reconciled?
The result in the Technical Advice Memorandum is consistent with
Owen yet entirely inconsistent with Professional Equities.
1. OWEN: TRANSFER OF LIABILITIES BETWEEN RELATED PARTIES
In 1977, Owen and McEachron formed a general partnership.72
Three years later, they borrowed money to buy equipment, secured the
loan with the equipment, gave the lender personal guarantees, and
placed title to the equipment in the partnership. The partnership then
leased the equipment to a related corporation.73
One year later, the partnership transferred all of its assets to the
related corporation. At that time, the loans exceeded the equipment's
70. See discussion infra Part IV.A. (regarding the Service and the Ninth Circuit's position on
transfers of liabilities between related parties). But see Lessinger v. Commissioner, 872 F.2d 519
(2nd Cir. 1989) (holding that a proprietorship's transfer of property with liabilities in excess of
basis did not trigger § 357(c) gain because the transferor offset the liabilities with his personal
note); Maher v. Commissioner, 469 F.2d 225 (8th Cir. 1972) (holding that a shareholder did not
have taxable income on the transfer of encumbered stock to a controlled corporation even though
the corporation assumed the liability); Aizawa v. Commissioner, 99 T.C. 197 (1992) (holding that
only the portion of the liability that satisfied the foreclosure is subject to taxation because the
transferor remained primarily liable for the remainder), aff'd, 29 F.3d 630 (9th Cir. 1994).
71. See discussion infra Part IV.B.2. (regarding the Service's acquiescence in Professional
Equities).
72. See Owen v. Commissioner, 881 F.2d 832, 833 (9th Cir. 1989).
73. See id. In fact, the lessee corporation was owned by Owen and McEachron. See id.
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basis.74  The Service assessed a capital gain tax on the excess of the
liabilities over basis without regard to Owen's and McEachron's
assumption of the partnership debt.75
The Commissioner prevailed at the tax court level.76 On appeal,
Owen advanced a multi-pronged argument concerning section 357(C),
77
distinguishing between assumed liabilities and liabilities to which the
transferred property is subject.78 The latter category, he argued, applies
only to nonrecourse, unassumed liabilities.79 Citing Smith v. Commis-
sioner,8° Rosen v. Commissioner," and Beaver v. Commissioner,82 the
Ninth Circuit held that liabilities secured by collateral are excluded from
calculating gain "even if the transferor remains subject to the liabilities
following the transfer.
8 3
The Ninth Circuit's rationale is incomplete. The court chose to
ignore the legislative history of section 357(c) and the absurdities that
result in applying that section to recourse liabilities. Instead of address-
ing these issues, the court's rationale rests on overexpansive judicial
doctrine. The issue of whether a recourse liability can be transferred
was considered, with different results, in Professional Equities, Inc. v.
Commissioner.84
2. PROFESSIONAL EQUITIES: TRANSFER OF ENCUMBERED PROPERTY
BETWEEN UNRELATED PARTIES
Professional Equities, Inc. purchased land by either assuming
existing mortgages thereon or by executing deeds of trust and purchase
money notes.85 The taxpayer later resold the property using conditional
sales contracts whereby the buyers executed "wraparound mortgages"86
74. See id.
75. See id. at 832-33.
76. See Owen v. Commissioner, 53 T.C.M. (CCH) 1480 (1987).
77. Owen argued that § 357(c) should only apply when a transferor realizes an economic
benefit. See Owen, 881 F.2d at 835. In addition, he argued that § 357(c) does not apply to
liabilities that the transferor guarantees. See id. For arguments on the issue of economic benefit,
see supra Part III.B. and infra Part VI.
78. See Owen, 881 F.2d at 836.
79. See id.
80. 84 T.C. 889, 909 (1985).
81. 62 T.C. 11, 19 (1974), affd, 515 F.2d 507 (3d Cir. 1975).
82. 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 52, 54 (1980).
83. See Owen, 881 F.2d at 836.
84. 89 T.C. 165 (1987).
85. See id. at 167.
86. "Debt is 'wrapped' when property sold is subject to debt which the parties chose not to
pay off and not to assign." Report of Professor George Mundstock, in Lowell v. Commissioner,
Docket No. 15586-88, 28 (on file with the author). For example, assume a home is subject to a
favorable mortgage which is not assignable. To continue this favorable debt in the sale of the
home, the seller takes back a new note from the buyer, secured by a second mortgage. The seller
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in favor of Professional Equities.87 The issue in Professional Equities,
as in Owen and in the Technical Advice Memorandum, was whether the
transferee took recourse collateral subject to the liabilities regardless of
whether the transferor remained primarily liable. The Tax Court held
that the regulations at issue in Professional Equities, like those in Owen
and in the Technical Advice Memorandum, apply only if the transferee
assumes or takes the property subject to the liability.88
The Tax Court held that a new mortgage is executed by the trans-
feree which includes the transferor's unpaid balance of the underlying
debt. "The [transferee] does not assume or take the property subject to
the underlying indebtedness."89 The transferee is liable for and makes
payments to the transferor while the transferor remains liable for and
makes payments on the underlying indebtedness. Therefore, the transfer
of recourse collateral is not tantamount to a transfer of property subject
to the underlying indebtedness unless the transferee assumes the trans-
feror's obligation to repay.
B. Reconcilable Differences: Is the Service Paranoid About
Transfers Between Related Parties?
Why is the transfer of collateral secondarily secured by a recourse
liability transferred "subject to" the underlying liability in Owen but is
not transferred in Professional Equities? The answer could explain why
the Service cites to Owen principles in lieu of those espoused in Profes-
sional Equities in the Technical Advice Memorandum.9"
Professional Equities can be distinguished from the garden-variety
transactions at issue in Owen and in the Technical Advice Memoran-
dum. In essence, Professional Equities involved a transfer of recourse
collateral to an unrelated third party. The transaction fell within section
453(c) of the Code, which contains a built-in safeguard against transfer
abuses between related parties. The transactions involved in Owen and
in the Technical Advice Memorandum concerned section 351 transac-
tions that by definition must occur between related parties.9 The only
built-in safeguard to prevent transfer abuses between related parties is
found in section 357(c). By expanding the purpose of section 357(c) to
include transfers of recourse collateral, the Service and the courts have
remains primarily liable on the favorable debt, making all payments using payments from the new
debt. The new debt "wraps around" the favorable debt.
87. See Professional Equities, 89 T.C. at 167.
88. See id. at 171.
89. Id. (emphasis added).
90. Tech. Adv. Mem. 96-40-001 (Nov. 29, 1994).
91. See supra Part H.A. and accompanying notes for discussion of the rules relating to a tax-
free exchange under § 351.
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cast a wider net to capture all potential abuses, such as transfers of col-
lateral securing recourse liabilities where the transferors are insolvent.
This net, however, is overbroad and undermines congressional intent.
Congress' proclivity for scrutinizing dealings between related par-
ties finds expression in many deliberately prophylactic statutory provi-
sions.92 Nothing in the Code seems to warrant treating promises to pay
by related parties any differently than promises to pay between unrelated
parties.93
In substance, the transfers of recourse collateral described in the
Technical Advice Memorandum and in Owen closely parallel the trans-
fer of recourse collateral described in Professional Equities. Con-
versely, the form of the transactions parallels the transfer in Owen. The
only way to reconcile the Service's position in the Technical Advice
Memorandum is to analyze the inconsistency that distinguishes Profes-
sional Equities from Owen. The only barrier separating these divergent
positions is the Service's preoccupation with the degree of certainty as
to "whether the [taxpayer] will in fact make the payments on the indebt-
edness as promised." 94 In order to alleviate its paranoia, the Service
elevates form (Owen) over economic substance (Professional Equities)
whenever recourse collateral is transferred between related parties, irre-
spective of the transferor's commitment to repay the debt. This position
is neither supported by a logical reading of the Code nor by a meaning-
ful interpretation of its legislative history.
V. WHAT IS WRONG WITH FORM OVER SUBSTANCE?
The Service is elevating the form of the transaction-whether it is
between related or unrelated parties-over the substance of the transac-
tion-whether there has been a transfer of property subject to a liability
in an economic sense. What is wrong with form over substance? To
begin with, the courts and the Service are espousing a dogmatic
approach to deem transfers of liabilities between related parties. Such
dogma is unnecessary, causes absurd tax consequences, and the rationale
for elevating form over substance is more fabled than real. Additionally,
a taxpayer can avoid the tax consequences of section 357(c) by restruc-
turing the transaction, but such restructuring will cause unnecessary eco-
nomic costs.
92. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 267, 453(e), 453(g), 707(b), 1031(f) (1997).
93. But see Prop. Treas. Reg. §1.1012-2(a), 51 Fed. Reg. 12022, 12046 (1986). This
proposed regulation notes that dealings between related parties are not necessarily arm's-length
transactions. However, this proposition is far from a presumption that all transactions between
related parties are not arm's-length transactions. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 707(a) (1997) (addressing
transactions in which a partner is not considered to be acting in the capacity of partner).
94. Maher v. Commissioner, 469 F.2d 225, 229 n.6 (quoting Brief for Commissioner).
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A. A Dogma
Many commentators argue that the Service's genuine concern is
"whether the [taxpayer] will in fact make the payments on the indebted-
ness as promised. '95 Congress enacted section 357(c) to prevent a tax-
payer who has reaped the benefits of borrowing, such as increased
depreciation deductions or pocketing loan proceeds tax-free, from escap-
ing the obligation to repay by contributing property to a corporation and
later abandoning the corporation or allowing the corporation to abandon
the property, thereby permitting creditors to foreclose. 96 This is a con-
cern with nonrecourse liabilities, which concern is specifically addressed
in the literal language of sections 357(c) and 7701(g). This concern is
not always shared in the context of recourse liabilities.
In the context of recourse lending, a transferor cannot escape his or
her obligation to repay a debt unless the transferee agrees to repay the
debt and the third-party creditor agrees to release the transferor from his
or her primary obligation to repay the debt. A legitimate concern is
whether a related transferee will repay the loan to protect its interest in
the transferred collateral in the event the transferor defaults. Another
concern is that the transferor may avoid paying any tax if section 357(c)
does not apply to recourse liabilities.
These concerns do not justify over-expansive use of section 357(c).
First, such a transaction would not make any sense from a tax perspec-
tive. Second, the Service already has a mechanism, other than section
357(c), for capturing those who transfer encumbered property subject to
recourse liabilities simply to avoid taxation.
Any payments made on behalf of the transferor (shareholder) by the
transferee (corporation) will be recharacterized once payment is made.
The Service can recharacterize the loan payment as a dividend distribu-
tion.97 To the extent that the payment amount equals the corporation's
current and accumulated earnings and profits, the shareholder recognizes
ordinary income. 98 Any excess is tax-free to the extent of basis,99 and
95. Id.
96. See discussion supra Part II.C.2. (regarding the legislative history of § 357(c)). The
shareholder is shielded from corporate liability. If the corporation becomes insolvent, and thus,
unable to repay the transferred obligation, the shareholder's economic loss is limited to his or her
basis in the shares.
97. See, e.g., Plantation Patterns, Inc. v. Commissioner, 462 F.2d 712, 723-24 (5th Cir. 1972)
(recharacterizing payments on a debt owed by the corporation but guaranteed by the shareholder
as constructive dividends to the shareholder). "A constructive dividend is paid when a corporation
diverts property... to the use of a shareholder without expectation of repayment, even though no
formal dividend has been declared." Rev. Rul. 78-83, 1978-1 C.B. 79.
98. See I.R.C. § 301(c)(1) (1997).
99. See id. § 301(c)(2).
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any amounts remaining are accorded sale or exchange treatment."° If
the transferor were truly scheming to escape from section 357(c), he or
she would not likely trade capital gain tax resulting from the transfer for
ordinary income tax resulting from a constructive dividend.
The Service already has a mechanism for catching those who trans-
fer collateral securing a recourse liability for the sole purpose of avoid-
ing tax. The Service is apprehensive about limiting the scope of section
357(c) because if that section does not apply to transfers of encumbered
collateral (recourse or nonrecourse), an insolvent taxpayer may transfer
property that the transferee can use to offset income through deprecia-
tion, while the transferor defaults on the loan.101 The Service can reach
these transferors through section 357(b), which provides:
If, taking into consideration the nature of the liability and the circum-
stances in the light of which the arrangement for the assumption or
acquisition was made, it appears that the principal purpose of the tax-
payer with respect to the assumption or acquisition [of the lability]-
(A) was a purpose to avoid Federal income tax on the exchange,
then such assumption or acquisition (in the total amount of the liabil-
ity assumed or acquired pursuant to such exchange) shall, for pur-
poses of section 351, . . . be considered as money received by the
taxpayer on the exchange. 102
This section is the safety net that the Service and most courts have
ignored. The Sixth Circuit correctly applied section 357(b) to a transfer
of collateral secured by recourse liabilities in a section 351 transac-
tion.' 3 There, the Service taxed the transferor under section 357(b)
because the transferor's principal purpose for transferring the property
was to avoid the payment of income tax. The Service already has used
section 357(b) as a vehicle to capture those who transfer collateral sub-
ject to recourse liabilities for the sole purpose of avoiding tax.
B. Costly Alternatives
A taxpayer may alter the transaction to avoid the application of
section 357(c). For example, a transferor may borrow funds to repay a
recourse obligation securing the transferred collateral. This arrangement
"creates incentives for alternative financing arrangements with third-
party creditors that yield the desired, yet expensive-to-arrange, tax out-
100. See id. § 301(c)(3).
101. The transferor would not have income from discharge of indebtedness at the time of
default because insolvency excepts a taxpayer from realizing discharge-of-indebtedness income.
See id. § 108(a)(l)(B).
102. Id. § 357(b).
103. See Drybrough v. Commissioner, 376 F.2d 350 (6th Cir. 1967).
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comes. These outside credit arrangements also could exacerbate down-
turns in the economy by creditors less willing patiently to wait out a
debtor's default than might a related party creditor."''
VI. CONCLUSION: A FRAMEWORK FOR CLASSIFYING LIABILITIES
The issue of gain recognized on the disposition of property where
the liability exceeds basis can arise in a variety of contexts. 10 5 This
Comment demonstrates how section 357(c) taxes the excess of liabilities
over basis when a liability is assumed by a transferee or when a related
transferee takes transferred property "subject to" the liability. A transfer
of a liability where the transferee assumes a liability is uncontroversial.
Generally, the transferee takes affirmative steps to effect the assumption.
Unlike assumption of a liability, determining when a transferee takes
property "subject to" a liability is much more difficult in the context of
recourse liabilities."0 6 This difficulty may be attributed to the undefined
terms "subject to" and "liability," as well as the Code's lack of guidance
on the precise meaning of the terms. Absent meaningful guidance
regarding the purpose, nature, and extent of these terms, application to
various Code provisions leads to inconsistent,10 7 irrational, 8 and ineffi-
cient' 09 results.
It is a virtual maxim of taxation "that taxation of gains and losses is
predicated upon the realization of a related economic benefit or loss.' ' 1°
Therefore, when transferred assets are subject to liabilities exceeding
their aggregate basis, the unambiguous language of section 357(c)
ensures the statutory result. To prevent the transferor from escaping a
tax on the economic benefit (i.e., increased deductions on an unfunded
investment), the shareholder is deemed to have realized a gain on the
transfer to the extent the liability exceeds the property's tax basis. This
proposition presupposes that the transferee will pay the liability in the
future, but what if it is unreasonable to assume that the transferee can or
104. Barton, supra note 44, at 477.
105. For example, the issue may arise in a sale of property where the liabilities exceed both the
fair market value and the basis of property. The regulations provide that the amount of discharged
liabilities must be included in the taxpayer's amount realized regardless of whether the transferor
remains primarily liable. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-2 (1980). Or, the issue may arise when a
taxpayer, as in Tufts, walks away from a nonrecourse liability after depreciation deductions have
been taken and the property's fair market value is less than the principal on the debt. See
Commissioner v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 302-03 (1983). Gain is triggered when the taxpayer is
released from his or her obligation to repay the loan. See id. at 312.
106. The transfer of property subject to nonrecourse liabilities releases the transferor from his
or her primary obligation to repay the debt because the liability transfers with the property.
107. See discussion supra Section IV.
108. See discussion supra Section III.
109. See discussion supra Part VI.B.
110. Carter G. Bishop, A Tale of Two Liabilities, 16 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1, 4 (1990).
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will pay the liability? As this Comment illustrates, this lingering ques-
tion consistently leads to inconsistent and absurd results. One way to
answer the question is to develop a framework within which to deter-
mine when a transfer of property subject to a recourse liability should
and should not be subject to tax. This Comment proposes a two-step
framework: (1) determine whether the indebtedness is the transferor's
liability; and (2) determine whether there has been a transfer of the lia-
bility in an economic sense.
A. Defining Liabilities
The Code does not currently define "liability." The following is an
attempt to provide a working definition of "liability" consistent with the
rationale for taxing a transferor on the transfer of encumbered property:
to prevent the transferor from obtaining the tax benefits of borrowing
without the burden of satisfying his or her obligation to repay. 11 The
first step in the analysis is to determine whether a liability corresponds
to economic benefits attributed to the transferred property. A working
definition of "liability" that is consistent with the matching of tax bene-
fits to corresponding burdens is as follows:
[A]n obligation is a liability of the obligor... to the extent, but only
to the extent, that incurring or holding such obligation gives rise to-
(1) [T]he creation of, or an increase in, the basis of any property
owned by the obligor (including cash attributable to borrowing);
(2) A deduction that is taken into account in computing the taxa-
ble income of the obligor; or
(3) An expenditure that is not deductible in computing the obli-
gor's taxable income and is not properly chargeable to capital.... 
112
After determining whether property transferred is subject to a liability,
the analysis shifts to the actual transfer.
B. Timing the Transfer of Liabilities
If the purpose of taxing a transferor is to prevent the transferor from
exploiting tax benefits by shifting the liabilities to a transferee, then a
determination of whether to tax a transfer of encumbered property where
the transferor remains primarily liable should analyze the economic real-
ity of the transaction. The real issue is, and should be, whether the
transferor is going to repay the debt, not whether the transferor and
transferee are related parties. Section 357(c) does not set forth an ana-
I 11. See discussion supra Part III.C.3.
112. This definition is derived from Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-IT(g) (1988). This definition
does not appear in the final § 752 regulations because it properly belongs in a regulation under the
general definition section, § 7701. See Manning & Hesch, supra note 1, at 19, n.2.
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lytic framework to assess whether the transferor will repay the debt,
however, sections 465 and 752 provide plausible alternatives to the Ser-
vice's current methodology.
1. SECTION 1001
The regulations with respect to section 1001 are instructive on
interpreting when a recourse liability should be included in the trans-
feror's amount realized. 1 3 These regulations provide that "the amount
realized from a sale or other disposition of property includes the amount
of liabilities from which the transferor is discharged as a result of the
sale or disposition."' 14 Further, "[t]he amount realized on a sale or other
disposition of property that secures a recourse liability does not include
amounts that are.., income from the discharge of indebtedness. "115
Assuming that the Service taxes a related transferor on the transfer of
property subject to a recourse liability in an attempt to avoid the situa-
tion where a related transferee repays the debt and the transferee's pay-
ment would be explicitly excluded from the transferor's amount
realized. Payments made by a corporation on a debt for which the trans-
feror remains primarily liable would constitute income to the transferor
resulting from discharge of indebtedness. Such payments would be clas-
sified as either dividends or distributions.'
1 6
2. ECONOMIC RISK OF LOSS: §§ 465 AND 752
The "at-risk" rules117 and section 752(c) provide an analytic frame-
work. They are instructive in analyzing the economic realities of repay-
ment of recourse liabilities. Generally, the at-risk rules and section
752(c), like section 357(c), attempt to prevent taxpayers from exploiting
tax benefits without bearing economic burdens. Specifically, the at-risk
rules prevent taxpayers from taking deductions or losses that are attrib-
uted to a liability that they will never have to repay. The focus in this
section is whether the taxpayer actually bears the economic risk of loss
in the event of default.
Similarly, the regulations corresponding to section 752 illustrate
when a recourse liability is deemed to transfer with the property. Under
these regulations, a person has not taken property "subject to" a liability
unless the transferee "is personally obligated to pay the liability"1"8 and
the creditor "knows of the assumption and can directly enforce the
113. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-2 (1980).
114. Id. § 1.1001-2(a)(1) (emphasis added).
115. Id. § 1.1001-2(a)(2) (emphasis added).
116. See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
117. See I.R.C. § 465 (1997).
118. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(d)(1) (1991).
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[transferor's] obligation for the liability."'1 19 The partnership regulations
provide an exception where the transferor and transferee are related.'2 °
3. RE-ALLOCATE INCOME AND DEDUCTIONS AMONG RELATED
TAXPAYERS: §§ 367(d) AND 482
If the service is legitimately preoccupied with transfers of over-
encumbered property between related parties, then perhaps Congress
should enact a look-back provision like those found in sections 367(d)
and 482 of the Code.' 21 These sections respect transfers between related
parties unless the Secretary determines that a re-allocation of income
and/or deduction is necessary to prevent the evasion of taxes or to
clearly reflect the income of both the related transferor and transferee. 
122
This approach seems most equitable. It would embrace the arm's-length
approach to the transfer of recourse liabilities espoused in Professional
Equities and address the related-party concerns raised in Owen with the
benefit of hindsight in lieu of overbroad presumptions.
CHRISTINE L. AGNEW*
119. Id. § 1.752-1(d)(2).
120. If the disposition of encumbered property is between a partner and the partnership, the
liability is deemed transferred "to the extent that the amount of the liability does not exceed the
fair market value" at the time of disposition. Id. § 1.752-1(e). This provision was clearly
designed to accord pass-through treatment to partners. Therefore, it would not apply to the
situation in the Technical Advice Memorandum because corporate shareholders are not accorded
the same treatment in determining the basis for their shares.
121. I.R.C. §§ 367(d), 482 (1997).
122. Id.
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